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n	 ‘40 is the new 30’ – more than just a catchy phrase.
n	 	With increases in life expectancy, public policy must account for the number 
of years individuals will live after a given age.
n	 New measures of population aging introduced.
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Older people live longer and more active lives than ever before, challenging  
assumptions embedded in conventional measurement of population aging.
Rethinking Age and Aging 
by Warren Sanderson and Sergei Scherbov
According to the United Nations (UN), “Population ageing 
is unprecedented, without parallel in human history and 
the twenty-first century will witness even more rapid ageing 
than did the century just past.”1 In contrast to the growth of 
interest in and concern about population aging, the concepts 
used in analyzing it have remained static. 
With advances in health and life expectancy, measuring 
population aging presents a problem to demographers 
because the meaning of the number of years lived has 
changed. In western Europe in 1800, for example, less 
than 25 percent of males would survive to age 60, while 
today more than 90 percent of them do. A 60-year-
old man in western Europe today has around the same 
remaining life expectancy as a 43-year-old man in 1800. 
Today, a person who is 60 is considered middle-aged; 
in 1800, that 60-year-old was elderly. Older people are 
regularly doing things that were the province of younger 
people only a few years earlier. Now, 80-year-olds get 
knee replacements so they can continue hiking. Older 
people tend to have fewer disabilities than people of the 
same age in earlier decades, and now there is some evi-
dence that cognitive decline is being postponed as well.2
The media have recognized this change. We often 
read that “40 is the new 30,” but this is more than just a 
pop culture phrase. It is a challenge to demographers to 
rethink how they measure a population’s age and the pace 
of aging. 
This Population Bulletin illustrates how to use new mea-
sures of population aging that take into account changes 
in longevity over time and place. First, we discuss the 
surprising history of life expectancy change within the last 
150 years. Because of increases in life expectancies, it is 
misleading to compare those who are chronologically age 
40 today with people who were 40 a century ago. Second, 
we introduce the concept of “prospective age” as a way 
to compare people who live in periods and places where 
life expectancies differ. Finally, we build on the concept 
of prospective age in developing alternative definitions 
of median age, the elderly population, and old-age  
dependency ratios. 
The Concept of Age
The concept of age has become more complicated because 
life expectancy has increased and people at each age have 
had progressively more remaining years of life. As people 
modified their behavior to reflect these changes, 40-year-
olds began to act more like 30-year-olds had acted in 
the past. The key to understanding how 40 could be the 
new 30 lies in the history of life expectancy change (see 
Figure 1, page 4).
Increases in life expectancy cannot be separated from 
improvements in health. The UN estimates and forecasts 
life expectancy at birth for all countries from 1950 to 
2050, but statistics on health are sparse and often quite 
subjective. Because of the paucity of consistent data on 
health, we do not take health status into account here. 
When we discuss life expectancy increases, we are also 
talking about general improvements in health.
Although life expectancies have changed substantially 
over time and vary widely across countries, measures 
of aging based on chronological age do not take these 
variations into account. Two commonly used indicators 
of aging—the proportion of the population ages 65 and 
older and the old-age dependency ratio—assume that 
people become old at age 65. But generally, 65-year-olds 
today live longer than 65-year-olds in the past. A third 
commonly used indicator, median age, suffers from the 
Rethinking Age and Aging
4  www.prb.org  Population Bulletin     Vol. 63, No. 4  2008
Figure 1
Life Expectancies at Birth, Females, 1850–2005
Source: University of California, Berkeley and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Human 
Mortality Database (www.mortality.org and www.humanmortality.de, accessed Feb. 1, 2008).
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same drawback. If today’s median population age is 40, 
is this really the same as a median age of 30 in the past?
In a recent article in Nature, we provided the scien-
tific underpinning for understanding how 40 can be the 
new 30.3 Our work suggests that now is the time to shift 
to new ways of thinking about both age and aging. To 
facilitate such new thinking, we have produced a set of 
data with three new measures of population aging: the 
counterparts of the proportion of the population ages 
65 and older, the old-age dependency ratio, and the 
median age. All three new measures are adjusted to take 
into account differences in life expectancy. The new data 
cover all countries from 1955 to 2045. A subset of these 
new data for major regions of the world are in Table 2 
(page 10). The complete data set for all countries in  
the world is online at www.prb.org/Publications/ 
PopulationBulletins/2008/globalaging.aspx. 
Perhaps the most innovative feature of our approach is 
that we think about people as simultaneously having two 
ages. One is chronological age—the number of birthdays 
a person already has had. The second is prospective age— 
based on the number of birthdays a person can expect to 
have. That future number is their remaining life expec-
tancy. With two different age concepts, a person can be 
both 40 and 30 at the same time.
Demography is a quantitative discipline. Demographers 
inform us about population histories and possible futures 
through numbers. The numbers used in their tables and 
graphs have built-in assumptions. By studying popula-
tion aging and formulating policies in terms of measures 
that count 65-year-old people in 1900 as being effectively 
as old as 65-year-old people in 2000, demographers are 
making a strong and often unjustified assumption about 
the nature of population aging. They are asserting that, 
regardless of improvements in health and longevity, 
65-year-olds in 1900 and 2000 should be treated identi-
cally. In our measures of aging, 65-year-olds in 1900 and 
2000 would have different prospective ages and therefore 
would not be treated as having the same age. Over the 
next century, 65 could become the new 50. 
Life Expectancy Then and Now
One of the greatest accomplishments of humankind in 
the last 150 years is the increase in life expectancy at 
birth. Life expectancy figures go back to 1850 only for a 
handful of countries, but the story they tell is  
dramatic.4  Life expectancy at birth for a Swedish woman 
in 1850 was 47 years. By 2000, it was 82 years. The 
increase for Dutch women was even more rapid. In 1850, 
their life expectancy was 41 years and in 2000 it was 81, 
almost double. The increase for men was just as spectacu-
lar. Even though the increase was large, the continuation 
of life expectancy increases throughout the 20th century 
was unanticipated by many demographers.5 
The pace of increase in life expectancies in more devel-
oped countries has not slowed over the last half-century. 
Although somewhat controversial, there is an emerging 
consensus among demographers that there is little reason 
to expect a generalized slowdown in the near future.6 
For most countries, the history of life expectancy 
change since 1950 has been one of catching up to the 
countries with the highest life expectancies. But not all 
countries are catching up, and some are falling behind. 
For example, the recent life expectancy decreases in Kenya 
and South Africa are due to the spread of HIV/AIDS. In 
Russia, the decline began prior to the spread of that dis-
ease and has more to do with the deterioration of general 
social and economic conditions. In these cases, where life 
expectancies have declined, 30 may be the new 40.
Perhaps even more surprising than the increases in  
life expectancy at birth is the unabated upward trend in 
life expectancies at age 65. These increases are shown in 
Figure 2 for women in Australia, Italy, Japan, and west-
ern Germany. From 1970 to 2002 in Australia, Italy, and 
western Germany, life expectancy at age 65 increased at a 
rate of around 1.6 years per decade. In Japan, it increased 
at an amazing 2.3 years per decade. Regular increases in 
life expectancies at older ages in most countries of the 
world are now the norm. 
Rethinking Age and Aging
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Figure 2
Life Expectancies at Age 65, Females, 1950–2005
Source: University of California, Berkeley and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, 
Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org and www.humanmortality.de, accessed Feb. 1, 2008).
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The notion that 40 is the new 30 implies that people have 
two ages. A person can currently be 40, but in some other 
mode of accounting may also be 30. Is this notion just 
confusing what really ought to be a simple matter or is 
there real substance to the idea? Can demographers really 
think about age in two dimensions?
In 1984, economist Victor Fuchs suggested that people 
have two different ages.7 Borrowing from the com-
mon distinction in economics between values measured 
in current prices (nominal values) and those adjusted 
for inflation (real values), Fuchs suggested people have 
“nominal” and “real” ages. Nominal ages were chrono-
logical ages and real ages were ages adjusted for life 
expectancy or changes in mortality rates. In 2005, we 
independently reinvented Fuchs’ proposed “real age” and 
provided examples of how it could be consistently mea-
sured over time and across countries. 
Figure 3 illustrates our concept of two ages. Life 
expectancies in these figures are measured in the tradi-
tional way using period life tables. Period life tables reflect 
mortality risks in a particular year. We usually refer to life 
expectancy at an age other than at birth as “remaining 
life expectancy.” We use remaining life expectancy here 
to avoid confusion between life expectancy at birth and 
life expectancies at other ages. 
Figure 3 shows information about French women. The 
top bar in Panel A illustrates the life course of women 
born in 1922 who survived to age 30. In 1952, these 
women had a remaining life expectancy of 44.7 years. The 
bottom bar illustrates the life course of women born in 
1975, who survived to age 30 in 2005. In 2005, they had 
a life expectancy of 54.4 years. If you asked the first group 
of women how old they were in 1952 and the second 
how old they were in 2005, women in both groups would 
answer that they were 30 years old. And indeed, women 
in both groups would have lived 30 years. 
Although women in both groups had lived the same 
number of years, their remaining life expectancies were 
quite different. On average, the 30-year-olds in 2005 
had a remaining life expectancy of 54.4 years—9.7 more 
years than the 30-year-olds in 1952. Have women in 
the two groups aged at the same rate if their remaining 
life expectancies are so different?
We designed the bars in Panel A so that the lengths 
of the left-hand segments were the same, in this case 
30 years. When we did this, the lengths of the right-hand 
segments (remaining life expectancies) had to be differ-
ent. Panel B shows an alternative perspective: The right-
hand segments (remaining life expectancies) are the same 
length and left-hand segments (chronological age) vary.
In Panel B, the top bar again refers to French women 
who were 30 years old in 1952. They had a remaining 
life expectancy at that time of 44.7 years. The bottom 
bar again refers to women in 2005. Now, we make the 
right-hand portion of the bar (remaining life expectancy) 
just as long as it was for the 30-year-old women in 1952 
(44.7 years). But French women in 2005 who had a 
remaining life expectancy of 44.7 years were 40 years old.
In one sense, 30-year-old women in 1952 had aged as 
much as 40-year-old women had in 2005 because both 
groups had the same remaining life expectancy. So, 40 is 
the new 30, or to be more technically accurate, 40-year-
old French women in 2005 had the same remaining life 
Rethinking Age and Aging
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expectancy as 30-year-old French women had in 1952. 
When we measure age using 1952 as a base, we find that 
French women who were 40 years old in 2005 would 
have a prospective age of 30 because they had the same 
remaining life expectancy as 30-year-old French women 
in 1952. We call our new age measure prospective age 
because it assigns ages to people on the basis of their 
remaining life expectancies in a reference year, not on the 
number of years that they have already lived. 
Although this sort of thinking is rarely used in demog-
raphy, it is used every day in economics, where quantities 
are measured both before and after adjustment for infla-
tion (see Box 1). 
Prospective age is important because it affects how people 
live their lives and plan for the future. People with high 
prospective ages are less likely to invest in new skills and 
less likely to invest their savings based on a long-run rate 
of return.
In the United States, the increasing remaining life 
expectancies of older people interact with changes in the 
design of pension plans and retirement planning (see 
Box 2). Prospective age is also important for the design of 
public policies with respect to the elderly. New academic 
research on what individuals estimate their remaining life 
expectancy to be holds the promise of connecting those 
expectations forward to various types of behavior and 
backward to aggregate levels of remaining life expectancies. 
While prospective age is a new way of thinking about 
age and aging, it is not the only useful perspective. Chron-
ological age also remains important. A 40-year-old French 
woman in 2005 has the same remaining life expectancy as 
a 30-year-old French woman had in 1952, but she does not 
have the same remaining years of fecundity. French women 
who were 40 in 2005 had much more difficulty conceiv-
ing and giving birth to children than 30-year-old French 
women did in 1952. Increased life expectancy has not 
Box 1 
Adjusting Median Age for Life Expectancy
If you were told that a pair of shoes would cost $500 50 years from now, 
would you be able to tell whether those shoes were cheap or expensive? 
Certainly not. Adjusting for inflation, those shoes might cost $30 in to-
day’s prices or perhaps $300. If you were told that a person was 65 years 
old 50 years from now, would you be able to tell whether that person 
was old or not? Certainly not. People at age 65, 50 years from now, could 
have a remaining life expectancy of five years or 35 years. 
Economists deal with the issue of inflation all the time. In economics, 
constant dollars are used to compare values from one period to another 
by taking inflation into account. Prospective age serves an analogous 
purpose by comparing ages and taking the increase in life expectancy 
into account. Any kind of financial data that can be represented in dollar 
terms can be converted into constant dollars by using an appropriate 
price index. Demographers can follow a similar procedure and convert 
chronological age into prospective age using appropriate life tables. 
Without taking inflation into account, the gross domestic product of 
the United States rose from $415 billion in 1955 to $12 trillion in 2005.1  
When the figures are adjusted for inflation and reported as if prices were 
at the levels found in the year 2000, the increase is much lower. The 
median age of the U.S. population increased from 30.2 years in 1955 to 
36.1 years in 2005, when chronological ages are used. When prospec-
tive ages are used, based on the life table of 2000, the median age of 
the U.S. population actually decreases a bit. This decrease indicates that 
people at the median age in 2005 had a longer remaining life expectancy 
than people at the median age in 1955. 
When we compare the gross domestic products of different countries, 
it is useful to measure them using a standard set of prices, for example, 
the prices in the United States in 2000. When comparing aging mea-
sures across countries, it is also useful to use one standard life table, 
such as that of the United States in 2000.
Reference
1. The gross domestic product of a country is the value of all the goods and  
services produced within the borders of that country during a particular period 
of time, usually a year.
 Adjusting Current Median Age for Life Expectancy 
U.S. GDP, 
current 
dollars 
(billions)
U.S. GDP,  
2000  
dollars 
(billions)
U.S. median age, 
current 
chronological 
ages
U.S. median age, 
prospective ages 
based on the  
2000 life table
1955 414.8 2,212.8 30.2 36.3
2005 12,421.9 10,989.5 36.1 35.5
Sources: U.S. GDP figures from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. Economic Accounts”  
(www.bea.gov, accessed Aug. 7, 2008); and median ages from authors’ calculations using 
University of California, Berkeley and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Human 
Mortality Database (www.mortality.org and www.humanmortality.de, accessed Feb. 1, 2008).
Box 2 
Life Expectancy and When to Retire
The decision of when to retire is complex and has recently 
grown more complicated in the United States. In the last de-
cade, as life expectancies have continued to increase, defined 
benefit pension plans have become less common and defined 
contribution plans more common. In defined benefit plans, 
retirees know the pension payment that they will receive in the 
future. In defined contribution plans, those payments depend 
on the returns on the assets in which the contributions were 
invested. In essence, risk has been shifted from pension 
providers to pension recipients. The greater uncertainty of 
pension payouts interacts with the longer retirement times 
associated with increasing remaining life expectancies because 
the uncertainty in investment returns increases over time. The 
additional uncertainty of pension income among those people 
with defined contribution pension plans is likely to be one fac-
tor that leads them to retire later.
Reference 
Pierre-Carl Michaud and Susan Rohwedder, “Forecasting Labor Force 
Participation and Economic Resources of Early Baby Boomers,” 
Michigan Retirement Research Center Working Paper WP 2008: 175.
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transformed all aspects of our lives, and it is best to use the 
age concept most appropriate to the context.
Computing prospective age is a simple matter. It only 
requires matching remaining life expectancies in two life 
tables. This is shown in Table 1. Australian males who 
were 54 years old in 1950 had a remaining life expectancy 
of 19.6 years. To find their prospective age, we assume a 
base year, 2000 in this example, and look up the age of 
men who had the same life expectancy in 2000. As can be 
seen from the table, 62-year-old men in 2000 had exactly 
the same life expectancy as 54-year-old men did in 1950. 
In other words, using 2000 as our reference year, the 
prospective age of a 54-year-old Australian man in 1950 
was 62. For Australian men in 2000, 62 was the new 54.
Defining Old Age
Once analysts can think about age from two perspectives, a 
backward-looking one and a forward-looking one, new ways 
to assess aging become possible. When analysts compute the 
likely number of elderly people who will live in a country, 
should they count this group on the basis of chronological 
age or prospective age? With two measures of age, just how 
old do you have to be to be considered old?
It is commonly said that you are only as old as you feel. 
But if demographers took that view seriously they would 
have to give up much of their work. Feelings, besides 
being difficult to quantify, are individual-based measures. 
Life expectancy is a population-based measure. A person 
could be in an age group where remaining life expectancy 
is 30 years and die tomorrow. Life expectancies do not 
tell us anything about individuals, only about popula-
tions. Using prospective age instead of chronological age 
is a way to implement a population-based concept of old 
age that takes into account improvements in health and 
life expectancy.
With the enormous variability in life expectancies at 
older ages across countries and over time, a fixed age 
threshold for classifying people as old has not reflected 
reality. These fixed ages were established initially as 
rough approximations and have produced measures of 
population aging comparable across countries and time. 
Fixed ages, while they are useful, are not the only way 
to provide approximations. Aging measures based on 
fixed prospective ages are just as easy to compute and in 
many cases are more relevant. Measures that do not take 
variations in remaining life expectancies into account can 
miss an essential element. Aging is not only about the 
fact that people in a population are, on average, older. 
It also means that these older people are healthier and 
have longer remaining life expectancies than their earlier 
counterparts. 
An alternative to having a fixed age at which people 
are categorized as old is to define old age as beginning at 
some threshold level of remaining life expectancy. This 
theory was first offered by Norman Ryder in 1975; he 
recommended that old age be considered to begin when 
remaining life expectancy fell below 10 years. Fuchs fol-
lowed with a more complete analysis in 1984. In 1993, 
Jacob Siegel suggested the possibility of using a remaining 
life expectancy of either 10 or 15 years to demarcate the 
boundary of old age. He showed what those boundaries 
would be in the United States for the years 1940 to 1985 
and what they were likely to be from 1990 to 2030. To 
our knowledge, in 2008, Wolfgang Lutz and we did the 
first computation of the proportions of the elderly in the 
world and in the populations of major regions, basing the 
onset of old age on remaining years of life expectancy.8
Choosing to define old age as beginning at some 
remaining life expectancy threshold is equivalent to defin-
ing it as occurring at a fixed prospective age. Thus, there 
are two ways of defining old age: an old-age threshold 
based on chronological age and one based on prospective 
age. Here we define old age as beginning when people 
are at ages where remaining life expectancy is 15 or 
fewer years.9
Each country has its own history of when people could 
be considered to be old, a history that could be different 
for men and women, and a history that depends on social 
and economic changes, public health improvements, and 
personal consumption choices (such as cigarette smok-
ing). Simply considering men and women old when they 
reach age 65 ignores this history. 
Counting people as old when their remaining life 
expectancy is 15 or fewer years may not be the best way 
to determine which individuals are old. We could count 
people as being old depending on a host of physical, 
mental, social, economic, and emotional factors, but 
Table 1
Computation of Prospective Age of a 54-Year-Old Australian 
Male (Using 2000 as a Base Year)
Age in 1950
Life 
expectancy 
at age 54 in 
1950 Age in 2000
Life 
expectancy  
at indicated 
age in 2000
60 21.27
61 20.43
54 19.63 62 19.63
63 18.82
64 18.03
Source: University of California, Berkeley and Max Planck Institute for Demographic 
Research, Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org and www.humanmortality.de, 
accessed Feb. 1, 2008).
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we have little information about how to do this. We 
could also set different numbers of remaining years of 
life in different countries. To take an arbitrary example, 
we could say that people fall into the category of being 
old when they are at ages with a remaining life expec-
tancy of 10 years or less in Switzerland and 17 or less in 
Swaziland. But we would have no basis on which to make 
such distinctions. 
Counting people as old depending on the number of 
years people in their age group have yet to live is a simple 
population-based measure, and it has the advantage of 
being possible to calculate for all the countries for which 
the UN produces data. We have computed the new old-
age thresholds using UN estimates going back to 1955 
and UN forecasts through 2045. This allows us to retell 
the histories of aging in each country in a richer way and 
to look at the future of aging from a new perspective. 
(The complete set of data with these thresholds and other 
measures presented below are available at www.prb.org/
Publications/PopulationBulletins/2008/globalaging.aspx.)
There is already a demand for new measures of aging 
based on prospective age. Prospective median age has 
already been chosen as one of the basic demographic indi-
cators to monitor as part of the implementation strategy 
of the Madrid International Plan of Action on Aging.10 
Using prospective age to define target populations for 
social programs has the potential to make better use of 
both public and private resources.
With a fixed age for being considered old, public and pri-
vate assistance may be directed at individuals who are much 
better off than the elderly were when a fixed age for eligibil-
ity was established. For example, eligibility for U.S. Medicare 
programs was set at age 65 in 1965. If that age were adjusted 
for life expectancy change beginning in 2004, the eligibil-
ity age in 2050 would be 68 for men and 67 for women.11 
As life expectancy increases, the age at which physical care 
is needed gets pushed back. With a definition of old that 
uses variable age based on life expectancy, public and private 
resources for the elderly may be better targeted at a larger or 
smaller proportion of the population.
Demographers study aging using a number of indica-
tors. Three of the most widely used are the proportion of 
the population ages 65 and older, the old-age dependency 
ratio, and the median age of the population.12 In the next 
section, we look at the history and the likely future of 
population aging using these three conventional measures 
and three analogous ones based on prospective ages that 
take life expectancy change into account. 
Population Aging Measures
The Proportion of Elderly
One common indicator of population aging is the pro-
portion of elderly in the population. Frequently, this is 
computed using the ratio of people who are 65 and older 
(or 60 and older) to the total population, and is often 
supplemented with the ratio of the “oldest-old” (80 and 
above) to the total population. For simplicity, we take as 
our conventional measure the ratio of people 65 and older 
to the total population. We compare it to a new measure 
of the proportion of the population who are old: the ratio 
of those in age groups where remaining life expectancy is 
15 years or less to the total population. The conventional 
measure looks at aging from the perspective of the number 
of years lived. The new measure looks at aging from the 
perspective of the number of years left to live.
Both the conventional measure and our new measure are 
influenced by life expectancy because both depend on the 
age structure of the population. If, for example, mortal-
ity rates at older ages fall, then, other things constant, the 
proportion of older people in the population will increase. 
The conventional measure looks at aging from the perspec-
tive of the number of years already lived and therefore uses 
a fixed chronological age cutoff, such as 65, to determine 
who is old. Changes in life expectancy influence the pro-
portion age 65 or older. When mortality rates fall, there are 
additional older people, and these older people have longer 
remaining life expectancies. People at age 65 might have 
a remaining life expectancy of 13 years before the decline 
in mortality rates and 17 years after the decline. Because 
of this, the new measure would count the 65-year-olds as 
being elderly in the original higher-mortality environment, 
but not in the later lower-mortality one.
Figure 4 shows the proportion of the world’s popula-
tion who are 65 and older (Prop. 65+) and the proportion 
at ages with remaining life expectancies of 15 or fewer 
years (Prop. RLE 15-). The conventional measure, Prop. 
65+, begins with 5.3 percent of the world’s population in 
1955 and rises slowly to 7.4 percent in 2005. During the 
next two decades, the predicted share rises by 2 percent-
age points to 9.4 percent but then rises much more 
rapidly to 15.2 percent in 2045. Prop. 65+ is almost three 
times as high in 2045 as it was in 1955.
In contrast, Prop. RLE 15- shows the share of the 
elderly at 8.0 percent in 1955 and falling to 6.4 per-
cent in 1990. For a decade and a half, the share roughly 
stabilizes, then begins to increase slowly to 2025 when 
it returns to the 8.0 percent level, the same as in 1995. 
After 2025, the share rises more rapidly, reaching 10.9 
percent in 2045. 
Rethinking Age and Aging
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Both measures show acceleration in the pace of aging 
starting around 2015, but otherwise the patterns are quite 
different. Using the conventional measure, the world’s 
population was aging immediately after 1955. When the 
life expectancy adjusted measure (Prop. RLE 15-) is used, 
it appears that the world’s population was actually getting 
younger. Using RLE 15-, the proportion of elderly in the 
population is predicted to be the same in 2025 as it was 
in 1955. Prop. 65+ indicates that the share of elderly is 
4.1 percentage points higher than in 1955. Overall, the 
conventional measures predict that the share of elderly in 
the world population will rise by 9.9 percentage points 
from 1955 to 2045, and Prop. RLE 15- , the measure 
adjusted for life expectancy, predicts an increase of 
2.9 percentage points.
The two indicators of aging for more developed 
regions are similar for the period from 1955 to 1975 
and then begin to diverge. In 2005, Prop. 65+ indicates 
that 15.3 percent of the population is old, while Prop. 
RLE 15- shows only 11.7 percent (see Table 2, page 10). 
There is some acceleration in the pace of aging predicted 
in those regions starting around 2010 followed by some 
deceleration beginning around 2030. Both measures pre-
dict significant aging for the period from 2005 to 2045. 
Prop 65+ signals a larger increase, 10 percentage points, 
than the 4.7 percent points estimated with Prop. RLE 
15-. The histories and predicted futures of aging in the 
more developed regions are roughly similar for both mea-
sures, but because Prop. RLE 15- takes life expectancy 
increase into account, it shows a slower pace of aging. 
In less developed countries, the history of aging is 
different depending on the measure used. Based on 
Prop. 65+, the share of elderly increases from 3.9 percent 
in 1955 to 5.5 percent in 2005, indicating a slow process 
of population aging. Prop. RLE 15-, on the other hand, 
shows the share decreasing from 7.9 percent in 1955 to 
5.6 percent in 2005. Although the two indicators differ 
in their direction of change in the historical period, they 
tell the same story about the future. Both show consider-
able increases in the share of the older population from 
2005 to 2045. In the developing regions, aging is cer-
tainly speeding up, even after accounting for life expec-
tancy change.
The two indicators differ in their direction of change in 
the least developed countries during the historical period, 
while both show increases in aging going forward to 
2045. Prop. RLE 15- is considerably higher in 1955 than 
Prop. 65, because remaining life expectancies at age 65 in 
those countries in 1955 were well below 15 years and so 
the threshold age for being considered old was younger 
than 65. The rapid decline in Prop. RLE 15- after 1955 
is due to the rapid increase in life expectancies at older 
ages in those countries. While we think of life expectancy 
increase in the least developed countries after 1955 as 
resulting mainly from decreases in infant mortality, these 
numbers show consequential increases in the longevity of 
older people as well.
The Old-Age Dependency Ratio
In this section, we analyze old-age dependency ratios. The 
Conventional Old-Age Dependency Ratio (OADR) is 
defined here as the ratio of the number of people 65 years 
or older to the number of people ages 20 through 64: 
OADR   = 
       Number of people 65 years or older 
        Number of people ages 20 to 64
 Minor variations of this definition for the old-age 
dependency ratio are found in demography. Sometimes 
the proportion of people 60 or older is used in the 
numerator, sometimes 15 is used as the lower bound on 
the ages of people in the denominator, or sometimes the 
ratio is multiplied by 100.13 
The ideas that we have discussed can be used to pro-
duce a new old-age dependency ratio that accounts for life 
expectancy change. We call this new measure the Prospec-
tive Old-Age Dependency Ratio (POADR). To define 
it, we first find the old-age threshold—the age at which 
remaining life expectancy falls below 15 years. POADR is 
Figure 4
Proportion of the World’s Population 65+ vs. the Proportion at Ages 
With Remaining Life Expectancies of 15 Years or Less
Sources: United Nations (UN), Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 
World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision (2005); and authors’ calculations.
Proportion
Year
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
Prop. 65+
Prop. RLE 15-
2045203520252015200519951985197519651955
Prop. 65+
Prop. RLE 15-
Rethinking Age and Aging
10  www.prb.org  Population Bulletin     Vol. 63, No. 4  2008
Median  
age
Prospective  
median age 
(PMA)  
(U.S. in 2000  
as a  
reference)
Percent  
of the  
population  
65+  
(Prop. 65+  
x 100)
Percent of the 
population  
at ages with 
remaining 
life expectancy  
15 years or less 
(Prop. RLE 15- 
x 100)
Age  
at which 
remaining  
life  
expectancy  
is 15 years
Conventional  
age  
dependency  
ratio  
(OADR) 
x100
Prospective  
age  
dependency  
ratio  
(POADR)
x100
2005 2045 2005 2045 2005 2045 2005 2045 2005 2045 2005 2045 2005 2045
WORLD 28.1 37.1 27.5 31.8 7.4 15.2 6.6 10.9 66.3 69.8 13.3 26.5 11.9 17.7
More developed 
regions 38.6 45.5 37.9 39.8 15.3 25.3 11.8 16.2 68.7 72.8 25.1 47.0 18.2 25.7
Less developed 
regions 25.6 35.7 25.1 29.7 5.5 13.5 5.6 10.2 64.8 68.9 10.3 23.4 10.5 16.8
Least developed 
countries 18.9 26.1 18.3 17.0 3.2 5.8 4.3 5.5 61.9 65.6 7.3 10.7 10.0 10.1
Other less devel-
oped countries
(excluding least devel-
oped countries)
26.8 38.3 26.2 32.4 5.9 15.6 5.9 11.6 65.0 69.2 10.7 26.5 10.7 18.6
Less developed 
regions
(excluding China)
23.3 33.6 22.8 26.7 4.8 11.3 5.0 8.5 64.5 68.6 9.5 19.5 9.9 13.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 18.0 24.6 18.9 14.2 3.1 4.7 4.3 4.8 61.6 65.0 7.4 8.8 10.4 8.9
AFRICA 18.9 26.1 19.5 16.6 3.4 5.8 4.4 5.3 62.2 65.9 7.7 10.7 10.1 9.8
Eastern Africa 17.5 24.3 17.4 12.2 3.0 4.5 3.9 4.4 62.0 65.2 7.2 8.5 9.8 8.3
Middle Africa 16.8 21.6 16.7 12.8 2.9 3.5 4.3 3.9 60.8 63.9 7.3 7.0 11.1 7.9
Northern Africa 23.0 34.6 22.3 28.9 4.6 12.0 5.0 9.3 64.0 67.9 8.9 20.3 9.7 15.1
Southern Africa 23.0 28.6 41.4 29.1 4.2 8.3 5.4 7.5 62.4 66.7 8.1 14.5 10.7 12.8
Western Africa 17.6 25.6 18.0 15.3 3.0 4.9 4.4 5.1 61.1 64.6 7.3 8.8 10.9 9.3
ASIA 27.7 39.0 26.9 33.4 6.4 16.2 6.3 12.2 65.3 69.2 11.4 27.7 11.1 19.5
Eastern Asia 33.5 45.5 32.5 40.4 8.7 24.1 7.7 17.9 66.4 70.3 14.0 43.5 12.3 29.2
South-central Asia 23.5 35.6 22.8 28.8 4.9 12.0 5.5 9.4 63.8 68.1 9.5 19.9 10.7 14.8
Southeast Asia 25.7 38.8 24.8 32.4 5.3 15.3 5.7 12.0 64.1 68.1 9.6 25.7 10.5 19.1
Western Asia 23.6 34.0 22.9 28.2 4.5 11.5 4.9 8.8 64.1 68.2 8.8 19.4 9.5 14.3
EUROPE 39.0 47.2 38.3 41.4 15.9 26.6 13.4 18.0 67.5 71.8 25.9 49.7 20.9 29.0
Eastern Europe 37.5 47.3 37.1 41.1 14.2 24.0 15.0 19.0 64.0 68.4 22.7 42.4 24.4 30.9
Northern Europe 38.9 43.8 38.1 38.5 15.8 23.7 12.3 15.6 68.8 72.7 26.4 43.5 19.5 24.9
Southern Europe 39.8 50.4 39.1 45.6 17.5 31.8 13.1 19.6 69.5 73.3 28.3 63.8 19.7 31.5
Western Europe 40.7 46.7 40.0 41.7 17.4 27.6 12.3 18.2 69.9 73.5 28.8 53.0 18.8 29.6
LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE  
CARIBBEAN
25.9 38.5 24.9 32.8 6.1 16.7 4.6 10.0 68.5 72.0 11.2 28.7 8.2 15.5
Central America 24.0 38.9 23.1 34.1 5.1 16.6 3.6 9.6 69.1 72.1 9.9 28.7 6.8 14.8
South America 26.4 38.4 25.4 32.4 6.3 16.6 4.8 10.0 68.3 72.0 11.5 28.5 8.5 15.5
NORTH 
AMERICA 36.3 41.1 35.7 36.5 12.4 20.8 9.1 13.3 69.8 72.8 20.7 37.1 14.3 21.0
Sources: All our data, including those at www.prb.org/Publications/PopulationBulletins/2008/globalaging.aspx, are based on the UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, (2005), volumes 1, 2, and 3. We used the 2004 Revision because this was the latest year for which the past and future life tables were avail-
able to us. Users should be cautious about interpreting the results for developing countries with poor quality statistical data, including many in sub-Saharan Africa and a few in Asia. The data 
follow all the UN naming conventions and cover all the countries and regions included in the 2004 Revision. The UN data cover the period 1950 to 2050. The UN provides life expectancies for 
five-year periods. The first is 1950–55 and the last is 2045–50. The information that we use for 1955, for example, is based on an interpolation between figures for 1950–55 and 1955–60. Because 
we have to use interpolated information, we lose the earliest and latest UN dates.
Table 2
Conventional and Prospective Measures of Population Aging for Major World Regions, 2005 and 2045
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the ratio of the number of people above the old-age thresh-
old to the number from age 20 to the old-age threshold: 
POADR   = 
   Number of people older than the Old-Age Threshold 
   Number of people ages 20 to the Old-Age Threshold
Figure 5 shows conventional OADRs and POADRs 
for the world, more developed countries, less developed 
countries, and least developed countries. The numera-
tors in the conventional OADR are the same numbers as 
in Prop. 65+, but the denominators differ. Similarly, the 
numerators in the POADR are the same as the numbers 
in the numerator of Prop. RLE 15-. In the conventional 
OADR, people are counted in the numerator if they are 
65 or older, regardless of the remaining life expectancy 
at that age. In the POADR, only those people who are 
in age groups with 15 or fewer years of remaining life 
expectancy are counted. As we would expect from the 
similarities in their formulas, the patterns are similar to 
those described above for the proportion of elderly. 
Table 2 provides data on the two old-age dependency 
ratios for major world regions. Europe is the oldest region. 
The conventional OADR in Europe rises from 0.150 in 
1955 to a predicted value of 0.497 in 2045. The POADR 
starts at about the same level in 1955, but increases to a 
much more modest 0.290 by 2045. (Data for 1955 are not 
in Table 2 and may be found at www.prb.org/Publications/
PopulationBulletins/2008/globalaging.aspx.)
Africa is the youngest region. The conventional OADR 
in Africa rises slowly from 0.071 in 1955 to 0.107 in 
2045. According to the POADR, the figure falls from 
1955 to 2005 and then roughly stabilizes. However, the 
quality of the data for some African countries is poor and 
may have affected these estimates. 
North America is an example of a region between the 
two extremes of Europe and Africa. Using the conven-
tional OADR as an indicator of population aging, we find 
it rising from 0.159 in 1955 to 0.207 in 2005 and then 
to 0.371 in 2045. The POADR falls from 0.188 in 1955 
to 0.143 in 2005 and then rises to 0.210 in 2045. We 
expect to see aging in North America regardless of which 
Figure 5
Conventional and Prospective Old-Age Dependency Ratios by Major Region, 1955–2045
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Sources: United Nations (UN), Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision (2005); and authors’ calculations.
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old-age dependency ratio we use. But using the POADR, 
we would expect the burden of old-age dependency to be 
only marginally greater there in 2045 than it was in 1955. 
To make comparison easier, we present data for five 
countries in Table 3. Japan is now one of the oldest 
countries in the world, and using conventional measures 
it is expected to remain so through 2050. In 2045, the 
predicted conventional OADR for Japan is 0.750. In 
other words, the UN predicts that by 2045, for every four 
Japanese ages 20 to 64, there will be three Japanese age 
65 or older. The nearest competitor included in the table 
(but not among all countries, as noted in Box 3) in 2045 is 
Germany, which has a much lower conventional OADR of 
0.548. At this rate for every two Germans in the age range 
20 to 64, there will be around one German age 65 or 
older. The next two oldest countries in the table using the 
conventional measure are China and Russia. 
What should we conclude from these conventional 
old-age dependency ratios? Would the old-age dependency 
burden in 2045 be much greater in Japan than in Germany 
and would China and Russia have lower old-age depen-
dency burdens? Not necessarily. The picture changes when 
we take life expectancy changes into account. In 2045, the 
oldest country in Table 3 is no longer Japan. According to 
the POADR, the oldest country is Germany. China and 
Russia are virtually tied for second and third place. Japan 
comes in fourth. Now, for every four Japanese adults in 
2045 who are not old, there will be around one Japanese 
elderly person to care for, not the three that we would 
expect on the basis of the conventional OADR.
From a purely demographic point of view, Japan is not 
expected to have a particularly high old-age dependency 
ratio once life expectancy changes are taken into account. 
Using POADR, the Germans have even more cause for 
worry about population aging than the Japanese do. 
Another interesting comparison is between Russia and 
the United States. According to the UN, the conventional 
OADRs in the two countries would be about the same 
in 2045, but the POADR is considerably lower in the 
United States than in Russia. This is a reflection of higher 
adult mortality rates in Russia. 
Median Age
The third common measure of aging is median age, where 
half the people in a country are younger than the median 
age and half are older. Changes in median ages are often 
used to chart how fast a country or region is aging. The 
distinction between chronological and prospective age 
made earlier in this Population Bulletin can immediately 
be applied to median ages. 
Imagine a country where the median age in 1960 is 30. 
If the prospective age of a 30-year-old in 1960 is 40, the 
prospective median age of the country in 1960 would be 
defined to be 40. To find prospective median age, first 
find the median age in a country and then find the pro-
spective age corresponding to that age. The prospective 
median age of a country in a particular year is simply the 
prospective age of median-aged persons in the country in 
that year.
Because there are no cohort life tables for every country 
in the world, we compute prospective median ages here 
using period life tables. In an earlier publication, we show 
that prospective median ages are very close to the same 
regardless of whether they are measured using period or 
cohort life tables.14
Just as economists can compute the outputs of many 
countries using a common currency in order to compare 
them properly, demographers can calculate prospective 
median ages of different countries using a common life 
table as a reference, in this case that of the United States 
in 2000.When we computed RLE 15- and POADR, we 
did not use a common life table as a reference. Those 
figures can be meaningfully compared across countries 
without such a standard. For example, the proportion of 
the population in ages where remaining life expectancies 
are 15 years or less in one country can naturally be com-
pared to the same ratio in another country. The computa-
tion of RLE 15- and POADR do not require the choice 
of a standard life table. On the other hand, to compute 
prospective median age we have to choose a standard life 
table. If we took two different life tables as standards, one 
for each country, no informative comparison could be 
made because any difference would depend on how the 
standard tables compared to one another.
Table 3
Conventional and Prospective Old-Age Dependency Ratios,  
Selected Countries, 1955, 1980, 2005, 2025, and 2045
1955 1980 2005 2025 2045
China
OADR 0.093 0.097 0.122 0.219 0.410
POADR 0.215 0.117 0.122 0.174 0.298
Germany
OADR 0.180 0.272 0.308 0.411 0.548
POADR 0.201 0.267 0.198 0.233 0.326
Japan
OADR 0.103 0.150 0.323 0.540 0.750
POADR 0.103 0.117 0.160 0.254 0.269
Russia
OADR 0.114 0.171 0.220 0.290 0.369
POADR 0.111 0.182 0.249 0.277 0.296
United States
OADR 0.160 0.196 0.206 0.311 0.360
POADR 0.191 0.173 0.145 0.170 0.207
Sources: United Nations (UN), Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 
World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision (2005); and authors’ calculations.
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Box 3 
The 10 Oldest Countries in the World, 2005 and 2045
Using the conventional old-age dependency ratio (OADR), the 
three oldest countries in the world in 2005 were Italy, Japan, and 
Germany (see tables). In 2045, Germany drops out of the list and 
is replaced by Spain. The conventional OADRs of Italy and Japan 
roughly double over the 40-year period. 
When we look at the oldest countries in the world adjusting for 
differences in life expectancy, we get an entirely different view of 
the situation in 2005. Instead of Italy and Japan being the oldest 
countries, Ukraine and Bulgaria are. They combine old popula-
tions and comparatively low life expectancies. Only two countries, 
Croatia and Latvia, are on both top 10 lists in 2005. Using the 
POADR, we see that the oldest countries in the world in 2005 
were all in eastern Europe.
Ukraine and Bulgaria are forecasted to remain the oldest coun-
tries in the world using the POADR in 2045. Italy reappears in 
the list in third place. In addition, Singapore, Cuba, Slovenia, and 
the Czech Republic are also expected to be among the 10 oldest 
countries in the world regardless of which measure is used.
What does it mean when countries such as Ukraine or Bulgaria 
have the highest POADRs, but not the highest OADRs? In these 
cases, low life expectancies at older ages make the difference. The 
UN forecasts of remaining life expectancies of 65-year-old men 
in Bulgaria and Ukraine in 2005–2010 are 13 years and 12 years, 
respectively. In the UN’s southern Europe region in 2005–2010, 
the corresponding remaining life expectancy was 16.3 years. 
Bulgaria and Ukraine have older populations, according to their 
prospective ages, because of the two countries’ shorter remaining 
lifetimes of the elderly. 
Eastern European governments, in their drive to increase the 
legal age for receiving full public pensions, often use the argu-
ment that in many western countries the legal ages are higher. 
One possible policy reform would be to raise the full public pen-
sion age for men in Ukraine to 65. Here is a case where present-
ing a prospective age measure could be informative. A 65-year-old 
Ukrainian male in 2008 would have around the same prospective 
age as a 69-year-old American male in that year, and immediately 
raising the age at receiving a full Social Security pension in the 
United States to 69 is certainly out of the question. This interna-
tional comparison is also relevant in policy formulation. 
One way to deal with high OADRs is to increase the eligibility 
age for various public programs, such as pensions. The compari-
son of the OADRs and POADRs teaches us a different lesson. 
One important set of polices in countries such as Bulgaria and 
Ukraine is to make their older population effectively younger by 
improving their health and longevity, which are currently low by 
international standards. 
The 10 Oldest Countries in the World According to the Conventional Old-Age Dependency Ratio
2005 OADR 2045 OADR
Italy 0.327 Italy 0.757
Japan 0.323 Japan 0.750
Germany 0.308 Spain 0.678
Belgium 0.294 Republic of Korea 0.634
Greece 0.293 Singapore 0.619
Sweden 0.293 Cuba 0.599
France 0.282 Slovenia 0.598
Croatia 0.282 Austria 0.584
Latvia 0.280 Czech Republic 0.582
Portugal 0.278 Portugal 0.576
The 10 Oldest Countries in the World According to the Prospective Old-Age Dependency Ratio
2005 POADR 2045 POADR
Ukraine 0.294 Ukraine 0.364
Bulgaria 0.283 Bulgaria 0.363
Belarus 0.265 Italy 0.359
Estonia 0.254 Singapore 0.353
Croatia 0.254 Cuba 0.353
Russian Federation 0.249 Romania 0.340
Georgia 0.246 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.339
Romania 0.245 Georgia 0.335
Latvia 0.241 Slovenia 0.330
Serbia and Montenegro 0.232 Czech Republic 0.329
Sources: United Nations (UN), Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision (2005);  
and authors’ calculations.  
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We illustrate the effects, over time and place, of adjust-
ing median ages for life expectancy increase by contrast-
ing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with the 
Republic of Korea.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North 
Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) were 
a single country until the end of World War II in 1945. 
Figure 6 shows the history and possible future of aging in 
the two countries. In 1955, the median ages of the two 
countries were about the same (Panel A). North Korea 
initially ages more quickly, but soon South Korea begins 
to age more rapidly. This continues throughout the period 
and by 2045, South Korea would have a median age more 
than 10 years higher than the one in North Korea. 
Contrast the trajectory of median ages with the view that 
we would get using prospective median ages (Panel B). The 
chronological median ages of the two countries are similar 
in 1955, but in the same year, South Korea’s prospec-
tive median age is already eight years higher than North 
Korea’s. The prospective median ages of the two countries 
follow a similar pattern until 1980. Between 1980 and 
2005, the difference between their prospective median ages 
diminished. After 2005, the prospective median ages are 
expected to drift further apart. 
New Thinking Applied to Policy
Older people today are more active than in previous 
generations. Athletes are now playing at close to the top 
of their game at later ages, and 70-year-olds are climbing 
Mt. Everest. Advertisements by financial planners now 
tell people that they have to save more to help finance a 
lengthening period of retirement. 
Until recently, demographers and policymakers have 
been stuck with measuring aging without taking into 
account the “40 is the new 30” phenomenon. None of 
the tools available to them, such as the proportion of 
elderly in the population, the old-age dependency ratio, 
or the median age, adjust for increases in life expectancy. 
When improvements in health and longevity are not 
taken into account, 65-year-olds in 1900 are effectively 
considered to be as old as 65-year-olds in 2000. 
But the new measures described in this Population 
Bulletin take life expectancy differences into account. 
Using UN data, we have calculated those measures for 
every country, major region, and the world as a whole 
over the period 1955 to 2045. A subset of the data is in 
the center table, and the full data is online at www.prb.org/
Publications/Population Bulletins/2008/globalaging.aspx.
What use are new concepts like prospective age? Some 
researchers suggest that prospective ages could be used in 
government programs affecting the older population.15 
The interesting question is how to do this.
A fixed chronological age for receiving a normal pen-
sion is unfair to younger generations. As life expectancies 
increase, generations pay into the pension system for a 
fixed number of years, but receive benefits over ever-
lengthening periods of retirement. But a fixed prospective 
Figure 6
Conventional and Prospective Median Ages, North and South Korea, 
1955–2045
Sources: United Nations (UN), Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 
World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision (2005); and authors’ calculations.
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age for receiving a normal pension is unfair to older genera-
tions. As life expectancies increase, they would have to pay 
into the pension system for more and more years, only 
to receive benefits over a fixed average period. Averaging 
chronological and prospective ages can produce an inter-
generationally fair normal pension age.16 This guarantees 
that additional years of life expectancy are shared between 
an increasing number of years of pension receipt and an 
increasing number of years of pension contribution.
Right now, the age for receiving a full Social Security 
pension in the United States is increasing. As it happens, 
this increase is generally quite consistent with ages sug-
gested by averaging chronological and prospective ages. 
However, current legislation calls for increases in the 
normal pension age to end with the cohort born in 1960. 
But with changes in life expectancy, there should be 
shifts in the age of eligibility for full pension receipt even 
among cohorts born after 1960, if the pension system is 
to remain fair to younger and older generations. 
Formulating policies for the elderly using prospective 
ages has an important benefit because longevity increases 
are uncertain and can even reverse. In the United States, 
the age for receiving a normal Social Security pension 
is going to increase regardless of whether or not the life 
expectancies of the recipient groups increase or decrease. 
If the obesity and diabetes epidemics in the United States 
cause the remaining life expectancies of older people to 
decrease, then those unfortunate generations would be 
doubly hit by the combination of declines in remain-
ing life expectancies and increases in normal pension 
ages. If the normal pension age took prospective age 
into account, this problem would not occur. Decreases 
in remaining life expectancies would result in decreas-
ing ages at a full Social Security pension. Each year of 
decrease in life expectancy would result in both the 
number of years of pension contribution and the number 
of years of pension receipt being reduced by less than 
one year.
Another area where prospective age can enter the policy 
dialogue is in the discussion of political attitudes. Jackson 
and Howe write: “The graying of the developed world’s 
electorates could . . . have more consequences . . . than 
the graying of their economies.”17 As populations age, 
will politicians tend to shy away from investments that 
have a payoff farther in the future and concentrate more 
on those with shorter-term payoffs? At first glance, this 
might seem likely. The median age of the voting popula-
tion in the United States will increase from 43.3 years 
in 2000 to around 50.5 years in 2050.18 One interpreta-
tion is that this increase of 7.2 years in median age could 
potentially translate into less concern for policies with 
long-run payoffs. But this interpretation ignores life 
expectancy change and therefore ignores the effects of 
possible changes on the time horizons of voters. Using the 
prospective median age of the U.S. voting-age popula-
tion, we find that the median age will decrease from 
43.3 years in 2000 to 41.7 years in 2050. In other words, 
although the U.S. electorate will be older in 2050 than 
it was in 2000, the median-aged voter will have a longer 
remaining life expectancy and therefore a longer time 
horizon than the median-aged voter had in 2000. 
Some policymakers already recognize the need for 
measures based on prospective age. A UN review of the 
Madrid International Plan of Action on Aging calls for 
factoring increases in remaining life expectancy into the 
pension formula and, thus, raising the retirement age 
automatically with rising life expectancy:
“New concepts of prospective age and standardized 
median life expectancy (Sanderson and Scherbov, 2005) 
need to be adopted, to enable recalculation of age not 
chronologically from birth, but biometrically from the 
end of life . . .  Such a reframing would permit concep-
tualizing the paradox that ageing societies like the ones 
in the ECE (European Commission for Europe) region 
might nevertheless grow ‘younger’ at the same time, if 
residual life expectancy at median age rises despite a 
simultaneous increase in the median age.”19
This brief discussion of the applications of life expec-
tancy-adjusted measures of age and aging is far from 
complete. The new indicators presented here offer choices 
about assumptions that underlie measures. These indica-
tors also open up new avenues of research. We are now in 
a position to rethink what we thought we knew about age 
and aging. And it is about time.
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that year.
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Demographers study aging using a number of indicators. Three of the most widely used are 
the proportion of the population ages 65 and older, the old-age dependency ratio, and the 
median age of the population. Until recently, demographers and policymakers have been 
stuck with measuring aging without taking into account the fact that older people today 
are, in general, more active and healthier than in previous generations. None of the usual 
indicators available adjust for increases in life expectancy. With advances in health and life 
expectancy, measuring population aging presents a problem to demographers because 
the meaning of the number of years lived has changed. New measures described in 
this Population Bulletin take life expectancy differences into account.
